The Press Says One Thing and Social Networks Another Very Different. A Category of the Detached: Contrary Frames between the Media and Twitter

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ABSTRACT: Several authors analyse the contrast between the framing that traditional media give to the news and what circulates on social networks. This article refers to that topic, addressed with a methodology that allowed to theorize about the detached political interaction on Twitter. With qualitative interviews and analysis with semantic networks, the theoretical category was erected on the opposition between the frames used by the traditional media and those of Twitter, observed by the detached ones. The detached are ordinary people, media-unknown tweeters with few followers, who interact politically on the Internet without hashtags, outside trends and electoral periods, and who go unnoticed by social studies. Constructivist Grounded Theory was applied in this study. The results show that the framing of press news is opposite to those that circulate on social networks.

KEYWORDS: Detached, contrary framings, press, Twitter, Grounded Theory, Atlas.ti, political participation on social networks.

I. INTRODUCTION

This article addresses a theoretical category resulting from a research carried out to understand how a group of users with the following characteristics conceive their political interaction on Twitter (now called X): 1) they are ordinary people, unknown to the media and with insignificant numbers of followers; who 2) talk about politics on Twitter on common days of the week, outside of electoral and political campaign contexts, 3) without using hashtags or trending words.

Due to the characteristics of the detached people and their interactions, their conversations escape the variables and data collection criteria usually used by social scholars, with the consequence that they are ignored or unknown, and the damage that both scientific researchers and journalists are unaware of this interaction that happens today on that social network.

Because of the particularities of the community studied, constructivist Grounded Theory was the appropriate research method to analyse its interactions. Grounded Theory is an inductive methodology whose object of study is described a posteriori because it's outlined as the data categorization process develops throughout the analysis. In its constructivist perspective, Grounded Theory recovers and revalue the qualities that inscribed it in symbolic interactionism since its birth.

The objects of study of constructivist Grounded Theory always change because they are shaped by the conception that human collectives have of their interactions. It´s the members of the communities who give meaning to their communication with others, and this methodology is aimed at knowing that meaning, that conception that the human group studied has of its interactions. And just as people's notion of their communicative actions evolves, so do the objects of study of constructivist Grounded Theory.

As an inductive method, Grounded Theory works without paradigms, without theoretical frameworks and without categories of analysis. The results of their studies are theorizations made from the categories that emerge from the analysis of their empirical data. In the case of constructivist Grounded Theory, data is collected with qualitative interviews carried out with members of the community studied. And in particular in this study, the analysis was carried out with the support of the tools provided by the qualitative data analysis software QDA Atlas.ti. In the software, the empirical data were coded and related to each other, forming semantic networks from which emerging categories, subcategories, properties, and dimensions were formed. At the end of the analysis, 16 theoretical categories were obtained.

This article presents one of the theoretical categories resulting from the study. The one that refers to the contrast that is observed between the frames with which traditional media present the news, and those that have that news circulating among those detached on the social network Twitter or X. The 16 theoretical categories emerged in a doctoral discovery research, carried out from the question: in what way, interactions of media-unknown tweeters, with few followers, who talk about politics without hashtags, outside of trends or electoral periods and who, for the same reason, go unnoticed by social studies, can be explained as detached?

The article is divided into three parts. It begins with a bibliographic mapping of studies on political participation in social networks and the differences in the framing of news in traditional media and social networks. It continues with a succinct

explanation of the research process that was followed with the constructivist Grounded Theory and ends with the presentation of the theoretical category on the contrasting frames that are observed between the press and social networks. At the end, conclusions are presented.

II. BIBLIOGRAPHIC MAPPING OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS

This section presents a bibliographic mapping of the studies carried out on political participation in social networks and emphasizes the studies that analyse the contrast between the frames with which the news is presented in traditional media with respect to what is commented on them on social networks. This is a cartography carried out in accordance with the typology of Maria J. Grant and Andrew Bootht (2009), who studied the most common forms of literature reviews and observed that bibliographic mapping delimits and categorizes existing materials, to enable the conducting of new reviews and identifying gaps in the research literature.

This cartography of the literature shows that there are no studies on political interaction on ordinary days of the week on social networks between common people who are media unknown. All research carried out on political participation in social networks collects its data in one of the following arenas: (1) contexts of elections, campaigns, or electoral debates; around political parties or candidates; or in relation to government activities and public service. (2) Mobilizations, protests, activism, and acts of organized or informal civil resistance. (3) Around hashtags, viral topics, influencers, journalists, or news presented by the media.

Most of these studies agree that variations in users' political involvement are related to the social networks they choose. Facebook is preferred for communication with known people or with shared strong social ties, while Twitter is used for interaction with unrelated people in physical life. Facebook is chosen to interact with local governments, and Twitter is chosen for broad political or public policy expression. Facebook is preferred for interaction with foundations or non-political organizations and Twitter for conversations with politicians and government institutions (Haro-de-Rosario et al., 2018); (Lee, 2021); (Sockmann et al., 2020), and (Valenzuela et al., 2018).

Although multiple evidence shows that the forms and contents of political conversations differ ostensibly between the various social networks, some authors don't specify the applications they used to carry out their research, reach general conclusions without distinguishing the political use of the different ones, or carry out research on political participation on platforms that haven't been shown to be preferred by users who like this type of interaction. When it comes to political participation, it's important to distinguish both the peculiarities of the various networks and the preferences of the users. Obviously not all applications are the same, so it doesn't seem correct to reach generic conclusions about political participation in the digital world, ignoring the fact that the forms of political participation are different between the various networks.

Differences have even been found between the socioeconomic level of the users and the mobilizing effect of these platforms. Hopp and Vargo (2017), for example, observed that there's a relationship between negative political advertising and citizen incivility, which is conditioned by the socioeconomic level of the users; and Zumárraga-Espinosa (2020) found a variation between socioeconomic level and the mobilizing effect of the Facebook and Twitter platforms.

Even the format in which political content is distributed varies between different social networks: Baquerizo-Neira and others (2021) observed that Ecuadorians generally publish iconographic images and are more active than Spaniards during periods of political campaigns. Other authors conclude that iconographic images constitute the main communication vehicle on Twitter in electoral campaigns (López-Rabadán et al., 2016); (Quevedo Redondo et al., 2016); (Ruiz del Olmo y Bustos Díaz, 2016) and (Ruíz del Olmo y Bustos Díaz, 2020).

Some researchers have observed that the political contexts in which this phenomenon occurs can determine the platforms that citizens choose to spread their messages. It seems that in authoritarian regimes the differences between the different applications are blurred, because the contents of the messages are prioritized over the media used to disseminate them, that is, when there is censorship by the State, users use whatever they have at their scope to spread their political messages regardless of the usage practices characteristic of the different networks. Feng Zhu and others (2019) regret that the literature doesn't pay attention to the creative use of social networks, because it positively predicts political participation through the mediation of online political expressions, which they observed with young people in China. Youmans and York (2012), in Egypt, conclude that social networks anonymously limit, prohibit content, and depend on community policies, while governments seek to increase their influence against them and implement infiltration and spy strategies.

There are also differences in political participation between cultures. The conclusions of Western researchers do not apply to the entire globe. In the United States, Lee and others (2022) found that more political participation is observed on YouTube, which can affect political learning, while participation isn't affected on Facebook and Twitter. But in Italy, Vaccari and others (2015) found that the more political information acquired on social networks, the greater the probability that users will contact their politicians by mail or on the networks, and that they will attend offline events to which they are invited. In Istanbul, Smith and others (2015) observed that social media efforts to bring about change —rather than calling for action and organization— are done by disseminating information. And in Colombia, Hopke and others (2016) observed that Twitter is more associated with

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online and offline political participation, and with online expressive communication, while Facebook is associated only with online expressive communication. Sockmann and others (2020) discuss how Twitter and Weibo, designed to be a source of information among the public and information-centered communication, better conduct political expression; while platforms designed to enhance social connections with private contact and user-centered, such as WhatsApp, Facebook and WeChat, tend to inhibit political expression. Dashti and others (2015) conclude that although social networks allow the exchange of opinions regardless of whether they are minority or majority, this is not true in Arab societies.

The differences in political participation according to the spaces of online and offline expression were also observed by Bekafigo and Mcbride (2013), who found that partisans and those interested in politics on Twitter are the same ones who engage in offline activism; Leyva (2017), who concluded that when it comes to formal participation and offline activism, highly participatory young people on social networks show minimal or marginal mobilization, and Vaccari and others (2015), mentioned in previous paragraphs, who found that the more political information acquired on social media, the more likely participants are to attend offline political events.

Studies that analyze the interaction between public administrators and citizens agree that officials don't dialogue with social media users or take advantage of their potential for horizontal communication to make decisions. Politicians use social networks to promote campaigns or try to persuade with slogans (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-Ripollés, 2018); (Arbaiza et al., 2022); (Campos-Domínguez, 2017); (Farkas & Schwartz, 2018); (García Silva, 2018); (Guerrero, 2016); (Kim & Park, 2012); (Kurt & Karaduman, 2012); (Leston-Bandeira & Bender, 2013); (Marino & Lo Presti, 2018); (Martínez-Rolán & Piñeiro-Otero, 2014); (Poulakidakos & Veneti, 2018) and (Rebelo et al., 2020). However, forms of reciprocal engagement between politicians and citizens on Twitter have been observed in Cyprus (Komodromos, 2015); Denmark (Sørensen, 2016), and the United States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Tromble, 2018).

Authors who analyze the authority and influence of Twitter on public opinion, comparatively with that of traditional media, agree that there's a reduction in the influence of the media on public opinion, with its respective increase in social networks (Bode & Dalrymple, 2016); (Bouza-García & Tuñón-Navarro, 2018); (Casero-Ripollés, 2020); (López-Jiménez, 2016) and (Syahputra & Ritonga, 2019).

Studies that analyze the frames between political news presented in traditional media and social networks agree that they are contradictory: there are discrepancies between the media discourse and the approach to political issues on Twitter (Anastasopoulos & Williams, 2019); (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013); (García-Perdomo, 2017); (Matos et al., 2017); (Nunomura, 2013); (Ofori-Parku & Moscato, 2018) and (Santos, 2020). Other authors have found that journalists use Twitter as a source of information (Gehrke & Benetti, 2020); (Justel-Vázquez et al., 2018) and (Parra Gómez, 2016); or that they offer more information on this network than in their media (Jaraba Molina et al., 2020), which allows us to affirm that on Twitter there may be information that isn't found elsewhere.

In addition to the articles by Robles and others (2015); Robles and Córdoba Hernández (2018); Rodríguez Cano (2017) and Said-Hung and Segado-Boj (2018), who observed that the frames developed by the press differ from those presented on social networks in national political agendas, other articles in this corpus reflect on the contrasting frames of traditional media with those of social networks. Cunha (2017) discusses that evangelical politicians in Brazil are made invisible by traditional media. Guha (2015) demands the existence of a bridge between corporate media and activism on social networks to involve citizens. And Ruiz-Mora and others (2021) conclude that, with social networks, citizens have found a new space to promote debate and the transmission of an alternative discourse to the official media.

The statement that political news on social networks and in traditional media handle contrasting frames appears in various articles, but the works that raise this divergence in their object of study are: García-Perdomo (2017), who in the presidential campaign in Colombia in 2014, observed that journalists follow the thematic framing and hatred, while the public is interested in the conflict and peace. Nunomura (2013), in the second round of presidential elections in Brazil in 2010, sought to examine whether Twitter reflects the agenda of the media or if users submit to the discourse of the traditional press and observed that there are discrepancies between the discourse of the media and the approach taken to political issues that are popularized on Twitter. Ofori-Parku and Moscato (2018) looked for differences in media coverage in Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States and the local control of the Twittersphere, in the #BringBackOurGirls campaign against the kidnappings of the Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram in Nigeria and found that the institutional norms, local policies and contextual realities disseminated by the media constrain the framings observed on social networks. Nina Santos (2020) states that the main media in Brazil guides the political discussion on social networks but that the speeches against it are extremely critical and articulate the demands against the press, during the protests against public transportation fares in Brazil in 2013.

This bibliographic mapping shows that Twitter currently influences traditional media and not the other way around, and that Twitter's authority and influence on public opinion is greater than that of the corporate press. One hundred percent of the studies that reflect on this phenomenon conclude that Twitter is a source of information for journalists, that citizens distrust the content of traditional media and that the framing of political news presented by the press is contrary to those seen on social networks. In this

sense, it's alarming that traditional media maintain agendas on national contexts that are clearly disconnected from the topics that are trending on social networks. Candidates and politicians, for their part, don't use or don't know how or don't want to take advantage of the possibilities that Twitter opens up to dialogue with their citizens; this attitude isn't consistent with studies that confirm how, when it comes to social causes, the interaction between popular personalities and common users translates into forms of social commitment and public debate, the latter being another consensus in the diverse collection of research that analyzes this issues.

The consensus in this bibliographic cartography in the statement that traditional media are losing both their authority as sources of information and their ability to influence public opinion, must be studied in more depth with new research. Only 13% of the studies in the complete corpus of this mapping analyze the differences in political participation, content and framing between social networks and traditional media, and yet, all of these studies agree in pointing out that, in front of social networks, traditional media no longer conduct public debate.

III. CONSTRUCTIVIST GROUNDED THEORY FOR THE DETACHED

Unlike other Grounded Theory strategies, in particular a constructivist study of social justice carried out with this methodology seeks to make visible an interaction of a community that has not been identified by science. Since there are no studies on the political conversations that occur on Twitter between ordinary citizens on ordinary days of the week, social studies tend to reject or deny implicitly —sometimes explicitly— the existence of these interactions. Whenever communication on social networks between ordinary citizens is analysed, studies use a political arena such as elections, activisms, hashtags, political entities highlighted by the media, political campaigns, etc. These contexts prevent us from observing the occurrence of detached interactions, precisely because they are conversations that happen outside of these arenas.

Employing the social justice perspective of constructivist Grounded Theory allowed me to make visible the interaction between ordinary citizens who discuss politics on Twitter on ordinary days of the week and, in this way, "establish an agenda for future actions, practices and policies in the analysis" (Charmaz, 2013, p. 281), as any inductive research carried out with this perspective is proposed. My interest in making these interactions visible is to put them on the scientific agenda, hoping that they will be incorporated into research practices that until today have ignored or denied the occurrence of the detached political conversation on Twitter. For this reason, it was not only enough to carry out this study with the constructivist approach of Grounded Theory, but it was also imperative to incorporate the social justice perspective that Kathy Charmaz (2013) proposed for this methodology.

The difference between this investigative process and other constructivist ones and with classical Grounded Theory in general is that it's applied to do justice to the social group studied, by making visible the conception that its members have of their interactions. It's a methodology that wants to recover the interactionist quality with which this method was born, founded by Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss in 1967 (2017).

Since qualitative interviews are the cornerstone of constructivist Grounded Theory empirical data collection, I deduced that the selection of research participants must be done by hand. Given this, I formed a list of seven conditions that potential interviewees had to meet, to integrate the empirical basis that supports the resulting theory that emerged from the analysis of the interactions of citizens not linked to the variables usually used in the collection of research data on social networks and, consequently, engage in detached political participation on Twitter. The conditions were, that the participants

1. allowed private communication to be established with the researcher on the Twitter platform;
2. publish tweets favourable to the government program of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador known as
   Fourth Transformation (Cuarta Transformación);
3. had between three and five thousand followers, and followed an equivalent number of accounts;
4. were active tweeters when López Obrador's presidential campaign began in 2018, or before;
5. publish at least one tweet daily;
6. publish text with their own words, and
7. participate in the conversation generated by their own posts.

When Grounded Theory is used to distinguish the interaction of invisible or unrecognized people, the research question guides the conditions that must be satisfied by the participants who can best account of the communicative practices they carry out in their social group. To achieve this task, I carried out three strategies. The first consisted of establishing the criteria that I mentioned above, which allowed me to affirm that the collaborators I chose are ordinary people that don't tweet for contract; that aren't recognized, influential or famous personalities, and that publish tweets on political issues daily.

The second strategy consisted of coding the interviews that I conducted with these collaborators, first forming direct quotes and then emerging categories, properties and dimensions, until reaching the first theoretical categories that I formed with semantic networks.

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And finally, in the third step, I analyzed these semantic networks, reconfiguring the maps and reintegrating the codes, with which I arrived at a total of 16 theoretical categories on which I built the argument of the detached political participation on Twitter.

I carried out strategies two and three using the Atlas.ti QDA software. Because the amount of data obtained in the initial coding of inductive methods is excessively extensive, I find that it is frankly impossible to carry out a study of this nature without the support of software.

Writing memos is part of the investigative procedure of this method; its main promoters highlight it imperatively. Virginia Monge, for example, states:

In the context of coding in Grounded Theory, memos are understood as the notes that the researcher writes about the emerging codes and categories. It is not an optional strategy; on the contrary, it is a fundamental procedure (Birks and Mills, 2011, p. 40) in the application of the methodology to any research. Glaser (2014) indicates that it is a process without a schedule, it is rather a process of conceptualizations practically all the time and recording what arises at the moment in which it occurs (2015, pp. 78-79).

Charmaz and Belgrave assure that "writing memos leads us to elevate our codes to tentative conceptual categories and can include the difficulties that the researcher experienced in making sense of the data" (2012, p. 357).

Atlas.ti allows memos to be incorporated into the canvas that is displayed to perform the analysis with semantic networks. The following figure shows the semantic network of the theoretical category presented in this article. In the formation of semantic networks in software, memo nodes look different from code nodes. The memos appear as white boxes that cannot be changed color, and on the left, there is a small pink piece of paper with the lower end folded. This feature of Atlas.ti helped me distinguish the memos from the rest of the codes and categories in each map, and I decided to use them as central nodes of each semantic network. In addition to indicating the title of the memo in each network, for me it meant that this was the initial substantive name with which I was designating the theoretical category in gestation. In the software, it's possible to open the memo when mapping the semantic network to make new annotations in situ, which allows recording the reflections as they arise in the analysis, which is very useful.


Fig. 1. Semantic network of opposing frames in the news between traditional media and Twitter. Source: Own elaboration based on data coding. The image was downloaded from QDA Atlas.ti

Memos are notes that describe what the researcher thought when labeled and assigned units of meaning to the incidents, actions, and events derived from the data. A field diary is of no use if the researcher cannot relate the written reflection with the specific code or category on which that reflection was made. The Atlas.ti makes this task easy.

The following image shows a screenshot of the software where, with the right button of the mouse, the memo of one of the codes that I managed in the initial stages of the analysis is displayed. In the left column it´s possible to see that the code that displays this memo is selected by the blue shading. The distribution graph at the bottom of the image shows which of the interviews carried out had codes related to the topic that I coded as "traditional media" (from the Spanish words medios tradicionales) at that time of the analysis. The memo shown alludes to the opposition between the framing of traditional media and Twitter.

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

Fig. 2. Atlas.ti screenshot showing the display of a memo when clicking on the relative category. Source: Own elaboration using the Atlas.ti software

The emerging theory of this investigative procedure isn't only built with the reflections that are made with the semantic networks in the process of determining categories based on the codes and the contents of the memos; the items of the interview script can also be incorporated into the theory: they are very useful towards the end of the research because allow the researcher to recover the idea of the phenomenon at the beginning of the research. For this reason, I recover the words verbatim from the second paragraph of the succinct memorandum that I present, which has to do with the assertion of my informants that the media distort or misinform: "Articles found in the bibliographic review also investigate the framing of the media as not coinciding with what is discussed on social networks" (from the Spanish words that appear in the memo: También artículos hallados en la revisión bibliográfica investigan los enmarcamientos de los medios como no coincidentes con lo que se conversa en las redes sociales).

Semantic network mapping is the strategy I followed to take my code groups to higher levels of abstraction, and it was the right one for the software I worked with. However, any type of grouping of elements that a researcher uses to relate their categories is valid. For my part, I promote semantic networks because they are visual, and it is very different to see the relationships between codes "with the eyes" than to infer them. Atlas.ti, in addition to the intuitive nature of its tools for mapping networks, as I said, offers the possibility of clicking on its nodes to display the corresponding memos.

Another strategy that I followed was that I colored the codes according to their categories, to identify them in each network as nodes of the same group. To give flexibility to the concepts, I decided not to write the categories directly on the maps; instead, I used one category from each group as trigger idea or starting point, relating it directly to the central memo node, so that it was visible to the eye which nodes related to each other with the vectors of each tentative category. In this way, I freely moved the nodes using the software window as a notebook, in which I freely changed the place codes, or deleted them from that work area or brought other nodes to that surface, arranging and rearranging nodes, changing their color, and passing them between tentative categories.

As I said, with this research I obtained a total of 16 theoretical categories. In the next section I present the category that refers to the opposing framings in the news between traditional media and social networks.

IV. NEWS WITH OPPOSITE FRAMES BETWEEN THE PRESS AND TWITTER

Casero-Ripollés (2020) used big data techniques on more than 120 million tweets and a machine learning methodology to analyze social networks and found that the exercise of Twitter's influence within the media system is being deeply reconfigured, and that globally the media obtain intermediate and low values in authority, which questions their power to condition the political conversation on Twitter effectively. In this regard, I think that reflection should begin on the validity of assuming that the media conditions political conversation, because everything indicates that they no longer do so. In my data there are narratives that illustrate this author's conclusions.

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The figure 1 above shows the semantic network on the opposing frames between traditional media and Twitter. "Without the tweeters who fight against misinformation, I wouldn't be able to see the wave of true information" (from the Spanish words that appear in the node: Sin los tuiteros que pelean contra la desinformación, yo no podría ver la ola de información verdadera) says a code on this map, which indicates two things: that the misinformation comes from a place outside Twitter and that the true information is the which is on Twitter.

According to the detached people, the information circulating on Twitter is "the true one," because the traditional media created a fence that blocks or filters the passage of information. The code: "The information fence was what forced us to look for where to share information" (El cerco informativo fue lo que nos obligó a buscar dónde compartir información) suggests that before social networks, audiences were already dissatisfied with the information provided by the media.

It looks like didn't happen that Web 2.0 motivated a twist regarding preferences for who delivers the news. There was prior dissatisfaction with traditional suppliers, but no way to choose other suppliers, nor a voice like the one users acquired with social networks to express that dissatisfaction. This narrative is observed in the code: "The networks have opened the debate because on television and radio it isn't so easy to open the guidelines" (Las redes han abierto el debate porque en la televisión y la radio no tan fácil se abren las pautas).

But, if not from the media, where do they get the information that circulates on Twitter? I ask this question to clarify what is meant by information here. Anyone can contribute a fragment of unpublished information, but here I'm referring to newsworthy information. It's evident that, for there to be information, someone must investigate it process it and deliver it, and that's the job of journalists. If journalists work in the media and the media are no longer the ones that provide the information that influences public opinion, where does the information come from? When the detached refer to "false" or "true" information, what they are referring to is the treatment given to the information. "False" information is what the media spreads. The "true" one is the one that circulates among them on Twitter.

What the detached reject is the treatment that traditional media give to information. In contrast, they seek the treatment of information that some users do on Twitter. In the code: "There are prepared people who fight fake news" (Hay gente preparada que combate a las fake news), it's implied that the news comes from a place outside of Twitter, that in that place the news are falsified, and that on Twitter, 'prepared' people 'clean it up' or gives them the treatment with which they want to see the notes. The latter can be seen in the code: "The comments can give you an overview that you may not know" (Los comentarios sí te pueden dar un panorama que a lo mejor tú no conoces). Who are these 'prepared' people? They are people that the detached choose on Twitter because of the treatment they give to the news.

The detached verify the validity of the news with their trusted tweeters. This attribute was assumed by a few columnists and professional commentators from the traditional media, whose authority is determined by the media corporations themselves. But on Twitter, users freely decide which tweeters they are going to grant the authority of the opinion to. Hence the codes: "We created a shield of citizens who don't allow themselves to be surprised by fake news" (Creamos un escudo de ciudadanos que no se deja sorprender con fake news) and "With the networks it is much more difficult to sustain a lie" (Con las redes es mucho más difícil sostener una mentira).

Why not choose another media outlet, instead of looking on Twitter for a trained person to combat fake news? Well, in the past that was the only thing that could be done, but evidently it hasn't been enough, perhaps because the treatments given to the news at the end of the day are very similar between the different brands. There's no relevant distinction observed in the framing carried out by the different traditional media companies in Mexico today. All media corporations are considered as a single hegemonic entity that gives the same treatment to the news regardless of who its owners are: "It is necessary to highlight this machinery that, far from seeking plurality, has distanced us from it, people of the mass media with its communicating vessel in the US" (Es necesario poner en evidencia esta maquinaria que lejos de buscar pluralidad nos ha alejado de ella, gente del mass media con su vaso comunicante en EEUU), indicates a code in this semantic network.

Furthermore, these hegemonic media are considered the cause of the social polarization that some studies currently observe: "The media bombardment is responsible for classism, racism and discrimination" (El bombardeo mediático es responsable del clasismo, el racismo y la discriminación). And it's not just that, there is also disdain for professional opinion makers and columnists who previously enjoyed prestige: "I'm starting to see profiles of well-known people who publish false things" (Empiezo a ver perfiles de gente reconocida que publica cosas falsas).The authority that has been granted to these persons who express their opinions in the traditional media doesn't arise from the conviction of the audiences, but from the decree of the corporations themselves. Until before Web 2.0, traditional media indicated to their audiences which ones were the authorities to analyse the information.

The certainty that the media lies is expressed in the code: "The media has no hesitation in lying" (Los medios no tienen el menor recato en mentir). This certainty arises from the possibility of comparing the framing given to the news, opened by social networks. Before Twitter, the interpretation of the world was predominantly done by people authorized by the media. These people obtain their authority from the hegemony held by the owners of newspapers, radio stations and television channels. It's the

owners of these large consortia who decide —and continue to do so— which people have the authority —which they themselves confer on them— to interpret the world. The rest of the population, without access to the lectern and microphone of those mass media authorities, was not heard. Since these media give authority to those who they decide, disagreeing with what they disseminate on a large scale is initially wrong. Any opinion contrary to that prevailing in the media is considered incorrect in a way that even seems natural: unique and isolated voices are surely wrong.

But the detached are not the public or the usual audience of the mass media. The detached are people dedicated to politics with a conviction that turns them into messengers. Currently, on Twitter it is possible to find more people interested in following a media-unknown user than a voice authorized by the media, precisely because on Twitter users decide motu proprio which tweeters to grant authority to, regardless of what the mass media say. The new authorities are the curious users who, taking advantage of the easy and intuitive tools at their disposal, verify the truth or falsehood of what the press publishes, searching in unedited contents or in contents with biases contrary to what the newspapers, radio and television news disseminate, and reporting their expeditions. However, it is likely that we aren't facing a reduction in the influence of the media, but rather a blurring of the boundaries of the power of the media in relation to social networks: what is promoted on social networks can reach as influential as what traditional media broadcast.

Of course, the media doesn't lie all the time. In fact, most of the time they tell the truth. The problem is that, among dozens of moderately relevant political news, they publish one or two truly relevant but edited, manipulated, or biased news; or they never publish them. In the balance at the end of the day, the media generally tells the small and medium truths, while leaving the big ones silent. This suggests that, while the media selectively opt for censorship, the voices chosen by those detached on Twitter are those that touch on the transcendental political issues of national life.

The detached have the capabilities to analyze their contexts and deploy the necessary strategies to decide which news is false or true, biased or balanced, in the press and on social networks. Some will do it better and some will do it worse, just as with any other human skill in everyday life.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In this article I presented the main reflections made from the theoretical category related to the contrary framings presented by the news disseminated by traditional media and social networks, which emerged from discovery research with which I obtained 16 theoretical categories about the political interaction of the detached on Twitter. It was very important that this research was inductive because, as Berná and others (2014) observed, when the analysis of the frames is done based on pre-established categories, the results end up being comparisons between categories and not between the frames themselves presented in the media and networks.

More studies are emerging every day that analyze the differences in the frames between news in the media and on social networks, and it would be interesting to study the differences between what happens in the press where "the frame is constituted through selection, emphasis and exclusion" (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015, p. 428), and in social networks where users change the media framing of the news by going to the original or unedited sources of that news, or simply presenting the opposite perspective. Obviously, framing a news story based on data should not be the same as framing a news story based on data that has already been framed. Furthermore, in the networks what happens is that users change the frames of the news published by the press, while in the press the framing begins from the moment the journalist decides what is and what isn't news. Ardèvol-Abreu says that "the frame isn't found in the text: the connection with the frame will be made from the meaning that the individual attributes to what he has read, seen and heard" (p. 436), which would be interesting to observe from the perspective of the framing that the news receives on social networks.

In this change of post that is happening around public opinion expressed on social networks, considering that before Web 2.0 it was the traditional media that said what public opinion was, it's necessary to reflect on the need to establish new meanings of the concept of formal political participation currently used to refer to offline participation, as opposed to online participation, which in its current understanding corresponds to informal or illegal participation.

Finally, I propose to reflect on the actions of fake news verification organizations on social networks. In the past, citizens were not provided with organizations to decide for them whether what was disseminated by traditional media is false or maliciously presented. Just as today it's believed by some authors that users need someone to determine for them the reliability of the content circulating on social networks, why it wasn't considered useful that some organization determine the truth or falsity of the content disseminated by the traditional media? The fact that this type of organizations hasn't been created in the case of the content disseminated by traditional media, leads to the assumption that the media don't lie, but according to the data from this research, they evidently do. Furthermore, it is undeniable that the final verdict of the fact-checkers depends on who finances them, and this means giving a new framing to the news that circulates —as we speak— in mass media and social networks.

The Press Says One Thing and Social Networks Another Very Different. A Category of The Detached: Contrary Frames Between the Media and Twitter

The decision of free citizens stands as the best alternative for democracy. A social media user is more likely to trust the opinion of another user to whom he freely granted authority based on his opinions published on the social network, than to trust the opinion of a person from a corporate media which is qualified as an opinion authorized by the same corporation.

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